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Abstrac t  and Introduction 
An important aspect of knowledge representation in AI systems is how to represent and reason with probabilistic statements. 
We observe that a starting set of probabilistic statements, each assigning a unique value to the probability of some sentence 
(perhaps condriional on some other sentence), in general does not determine a unique value for every sentence of interest. 
Rather, this probabilistic theory only determines an upper and a lower bound on the probability for each sentence of interest. 
Most approaches to probabilistic reasoning in AI nevertheless have been oriented toward unique-valued probability (e.g. 
MYCIN [ 17, 1 ], PnOSPECTOR [5, 10], Maximum Entropy [11, 12, 1 0,3]). In order to "converge" to unique values, they have been 
forced to make powerful additional assumptions (e.g. ot independence), and/or to ask delimited questions (i.e. to perform 
limited inference); often this has led to problems. The assumptions may be unjustified in the domain, or even outright 
inconsistent, either internally or in presence of other probabilistic information. The limitations on inference may be 
undesirable. To what extent a particular probabilistic conclusion depends on the assumptions made is often unclear. 
We present a paradigm of probabilislic knowledge as a system of inequalities over a space of propm;itions (augmented by 
other constraints, i.e. assumptions, e.g. of various (in)dependencies). We introduce the notion of an upper-lower probability 
distribution. w11ich generalizes both the usual probability distribution notion, and the Belief function of t11e Dempster-Shaler 
theory of evidence[16,4). This provides a unifying framework for: 
• representing ignorance and partial information; 
• represt'nling the effects of various kinds of (in)dependence assumptions; 
• confirmation and evidential combination; 
• Dempster-Shaler theory; 
• arbitrary deductive inference, including forward and backward chaining, indeed any resolution; 
•MYCIN; 
• PROSPECTOR; and 
• Maximum Entropy; 
The inequality paradigm provides a framework to analyze many of the dilferent aspects of, and proposed approaches to, 
p10habilistic knowledge representation and reasoning. Moreover, it su·;mests how to integrate the various approaches in a 
coherent manner, taking the best and most apt aspects of each. For example, we can combine evidential reasoning, and the 
explicit representation of ignorance and partial information (advantages of Dempster-Shaler) with unrestricted rule-based 
inference using conditional probabilities and Bayes' �1ule (an advantage of Bayesian approaches, notably PROSPECTOR). 
Thus the view of probabilities as bounded intervals offers advantages not only for conceptualization and analysis, but for novel 
synthesis as well. 
Unconditional Probabilistic Theories 
Our initial1 definition of a probabilistic statement is an axiom of the form: 
p(A) = t 
which is taken to mean: "the probability of A is t". Here A is an arbitrary sentence, more precisely a closed wff, in some logical 
la11guage L (we will use first-order logic in our examples). The value t is some real number in the closed interval [0,1f This 
definition has the axiom state a unique value for the unconditional probability of A. 
(Note that ordinary "non-probabilistic" logical statements (axioms) are just the special case of certainty;. i.e. the axiom A in 
usual logic just corresponds to the probabilistic statement: (p(JI.) = 1) .) 
Given an initial set K = {(p(A ) = t)} of such ;Jrobabilistic statements (axioms), we induce (entail) a probabilistic theory via 
probabilistic logic (ct. (14]). From 1the set S = {A } of sentences appearing in the statements (along with any other sentences I 
whose probability we happen to be interested in), we induce, model-theoretically, a closed space W of propositions over which 
the probabilistic theory is defined. W is the set of equivalence classes of interpretations for the sentences S, i.e. the set of 
consistent possible worlds corresponding to truth assignments to S3. (Her e consistency may be relative simply to L, or to 
some "background" (non-probabilistic) theory in L.) This propositional space W has the structure of a propositional logical 
language, i.e. it is isomorphic to the power set 2tF of a set F of "primitive" propositions. Thus W is isomorphic to the 
notion of a"frame of discernment" employed in Dempster-Shaler t heory . There F is viewed as a set of distinct 
"primitive" possibilities4• 
The initial set of statements K probabilistically entails ((14]) in general a set of bounded intervals, i.e. inequalities, rather than 
simply unique values, for the probabilities of the elements of W. That is, we have for each member W; of W: 
qi < p(Wt) < rt 
where q1 and r, are real numbers in [0,1]. We refer to this set of bounds as an upper-lower probability distributioll since for the 
probability of each W we have an upper and a lower bound, i.e. we can regard the value of p(W) as an interval. Since p(W) + I r. I I p(•W,) = 1, the upper-lower distribution is just equivalent to the set of lower bounds alone�. and to the set of upper bounds 
alone. 
The upper-lower probability distribution generalizes both the u�;ual (unique-valued) probability distribution notion, and the 
Belief function of the Dempster-Shaler theory of evidence. Note that the upper-lower distribution represents explicitly 
ignorance and partial information (underdeterminationJ. Complete ignorance about the probability of w, is expressed as an 
interval (0,1 )6. 
We would like to regard the upper-lower distribution on W, which we will call P2(W), as a set of concluded (entailed) 
probabilistic statements (axioms), just like K. This motivates a more general definition of a probabilistic statement as an axiom 
of the form: 
q < p(A) 
(or alternatively, as of the forms: 
1wo will ho troatmq 111101 vnls Ialor on. 
2However, this IS not essential; we might imagine using discretozed values; or anothor range, e.g. [-t,l]; or indeed some arbitrary trnnslorm of the usual probability 
llh.:;osuro whoch retai ns ils standard ax1oonatic poorcrtics. MYCtN u11<.1 PI10SPECTOil demonstrated the psychological anoJ computa\oonal usefulne:>s ot alternative, 
I:)Ornorphic representatJOns of probubility (5,17,9). 
3See [14] tor more detail s, inclu ding the "semantic tree• method for deriving W from S 
4 u11d is usually symbolized by 0 
5honco Shafer's tmno "lowor probability distribution• 
6
·vacuous" boliet in U1e terminology of Shaler (16] 
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p(A) < r ; or q < p(A) < r ) . 
The crux is that we have inequalities and bounded intervals for the probabilities of sentences. Our previous definition is just a 
special case corresponding to a degenerate interval, i.e. a pair of coinciding bounds. 
The more general definition of a probabilistic statement has a nice closure property. If our initial K comprises axioms stating 
unique values, we in general entail an upper-lower distribution. If our initial K comprises axioms stating bounds or intervals, we 
in general still entail an upper-lower distribution. Thus starting with bounds we in general end with bounds; starting with 
equalities (unique values) we in general do no better: we end with bounds rather than simply with equalities. 
Another way to view the axioms K is as constraints on the possible candidates for the ordinary (single-valued) probability 
distribution P(W). Thus we can think of the probabilistic theory as a set of constraints as well as as an upper-lower distribution. 
From the perspective of constraints, we may have two kinds of problems in a probabilistic theory: inconsistency, which can 
arise in the presence of overdetermination; and underdetermination, i.e. intervals too wide for our purposes. A variety of 
relaxation techniques have been proposed or employed to cope with inconsistency, involving both automatic and interactive 
(interviewing the user) aspects [15, 11). Underdetennination can only be overcome by adding more constraints. This means 
either enlarging K, or adding other sorts of constraints, e.g. various (in)dependence assumptions (we will discuss this more 
later). 
Conditional Probabilistic Theories 
We would like also to consider conditional probabilities, so as to represent probabilistic rules, i.e. 
"if <antecedent>, with certainty, then <consequent>, with <probability interval>". 
We thus generalize yet again our notion of a probabilistic statement, to be an axiom of the form: 
q < p(A I B) 
where A and B are both sentences in L, and q is a real number in [0,1]. II we view this as a rule, B is the antecedent; and A is 
the consequent. We will refer to this axiom as a conditional probabilistic inequality; we say it is a CP/(-form) axiom. 
Using the definition of conditional probability, the above CPI axiom is equivalent to: 
q X p(B) < p(A I\ B) 
which is an inequality constraint on unconditional probabilities. 
An initial set of axioms K of this more general form again entails a probabil istic theory. Our set of sentences S must include Bi 
as well as A, for each axiom inK (equivalently, both B , and {A1 I\ B .}. as well as A,). in inducing W. And our resultant theory is 
an upper-lower distribution on not just (W) but rather on (W 1 W), Le. bounds on all condit ional probabilities over the 
propositional space W. Thus we have genera lized the notion of probabilistic logic in (14] to extend to arbitrary 
conditionals , as well as to initial axioms stating bounds rather than single values. 
We can think of unconditional probabilities as a special case of conditional probabilities, where the antecedent is the (trivial) 
sentence (proposition) "True". 
Additional Assumptions As Constraints 
We may wish to constrain our probabilistic theory entailed by K, by the use of additional assumptions not expressed as 
CPI-form axioms. This has commonly been done in AI, in order to ease the task of probabilistic inference, and/or to "flesh 
out" underdetermined, incomplete, undesirably-partial probabilistic knowledge. We may or may not want to call these 
assumptions part of our "probabilistic knowledge" in the sense that K is. Often, they are thought of as only invoked in 
inference. However, since knowledge representation properly includes the reasoning operations on the formal 
representational structures (in analogy to abstract data types), they do comprise (a perhaps "auxiliary" sort of) probabilistic 
knowledge. 
An important type of such assumption, employed heavily in PROSPECTOR, is that of conditional independence, i.e. an 
assumption of the form: 
3 
"The propositional subspaces C and_D are statistically independent, conditional on the propositional subspace G." 
for all C1 1n C, OJ in D, and Gk 1n G. 
We can view Dempster's Rule in Dempster-Shaler theory, as well as the entropy maximization in the Maximum Entropy method, 
as other types ot assumptions not expressed in CPI form. 
Augmented Probabilistic "Logic" 
The presence of additional assumptions forces us to adopt a view of probabilistic knowledge which goes beyond probabilisitic 
logic as discussed above, which we will call "unaugmented" probabilistic logic. More generally what we have is a system of 
constraints on P(W I W). Those in CPI form comprise K; the others we call collectively D. This system {K & D) "entails" 
·(implies) P2(W I W), in the sense of determination by a system of inequalities (including equations). However, unlike in 
unaugmented probabilistic logic, the entailed P2(W I W) is not equivalent to, i.e. does not fully represent, the whole of the 
probabilistic knowledge. In unaugmented probabilistic logic P2(W I W) is equivalent to K. Now P2(W I W) is implied by, but 
does not in turn imply all of, (K & D). 
We refer to this more general probabilistic knowledge representation formalism as Augmented Probabilistic "Logic", or A-PL · 
for short. We will regard the constraints K and D as axioms in our logic 7 . We will be interested in the probabilistic theory T 
entailed (in the above sense) by these axioms, where T includes P2(W I W). CPI axioms are the traditionally explicit notion of 
probabilistic knowledge. The augmenting assumptions are traditionally implicit, but there is a duality between the 
information provided by K and by D: one can su bstitute for the other. 
Entailment in A-PL addresses the issues of inconsistency and of underdetermined status, i.e. non-degenerate probability 
intervals. A-PL makes clear what our probabilistic knowledge is, and in particular what our assumptions are. It separates the 
question of probabilistic infe renee from the semantics of our probabilistic theory, i.e. probabilistic entailment. We can then 
ask about the soundness and completeness of our probabilistic inference8 (more b elow). 
Evidence and Confirmation 
A considerable body of work in AI has been concerned with aggregating measures of confirmatory and disconfirmatory 
evidence for a common set of propositions. On the face of it, this problem may not appear to be compatible with the usual, 
classical notion of probability. One apparent difficulty is that if we formalize one piece of evidence as: 
; and another as: 
then we may have an inconsistency, e.g. if r1 < q2. Indeed, some researchers have gone so far as to invent new formalisms and 
methods, claiming classicnln probability is inadequate [17,16). 
However, we can incorporate some of the leading approaches to (probabilistic reasoning oriented towards) accumulated 
evidence and confirmation into the classical framework and our inequality paradigm, if we treat each piece of evidence as 
conditional on an evidential source (event). Because A-PL confronts explicitly the issue of ignorance and underdetermination , 
it avoids the problem of obligatory, yet unavailable, probabilistic "priors". 
For example, we can view a belief function 81 on a frame of discernment H. in Dempster-Shaler theory, as an upper-lower 
distribution P2(111 E1) 
10
• Then if we have two such, we can view Dempster's Rule as a constraint (assumption) relating the 
combined belief function 
to the individual belief functions 
7 For convenience, we will usually omit henceforth the scare quotes from the terms "logic" and "enlailrnenl" in the co,-,toxt of A-PL; however, lhink of them as implicit. 
8ot coursol as soon aS wo attack the question of infcrcnco, we need to consider justifications a11d reason mnintenonce (6]. 
9somelimes refermd Ia as "tJayesion" after lis us" of tJayas' Rule to combine probabilistic fnfonnnlion 
10More precisely, ll1e belief function corresponds to the lower bound for the probability of each membor of H; as we mentioned earlier, this is just equivalent to the 
upper and lower bounds togethor. Shafer uses !he term "plau�•bility funcllon" for the upper bounds. (16) 
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And so on for E1, ... , En' i.e. n belief functions, or "pieces" of evidence. 
We can think of this as "joint conditioning" since we are generating a new probabilistk (sub-)theory which is conditional on 
the joint evidence. Thus we represent the accumulation of evidence by augmenting the evidential conditionality of the 
upper-lower distribution that we are interested in, and by applying some assumptions in order to arrive at an "informative" 
such P2, i.e. one which is not "vacuous" in the sense of having a bounded interval of [0, 1] for all sentences in W. 
Unaugmented probabilistic logic yields a vacuous jointly-conditioned distribution, hence the need for one or more substantive 
augmenting assumptions as to how to combine evidence from different sources. 
The usual, classical, non-"evidential" approach to probabilistic reasoning can be viewed as conditional (trivially) on only one 
evidential source event. It avoids the issue of joint conditioning. 
The Certainty Factors approach to confirmation, pioneered by MYCIN, can also be reformulated in terms of conditional 
probabilities. Though the MYCIN formalism has some problemB, it can be recast without much violation as isomorphic to 
probabilities, where the combination of certainty factors CF(H,E I) and CF(H,E2) corresponds to something close to the 
conditional independence assumption made in PROSPECTOR [5), as well as to a special case of Dempster's Rule. See [9,8) 
for details. 
Analytic Application of the Paradigm: Entailment 
A common, and in many repects desirable, state of affairs is for our entailed upper-lower distribution P2(W 1 W) to be 
representable in a more compact, simpler form than is possible in general: for example, as a single-valued probability 
distribution P1 (WI W); or, as a Dempster-Shaler mass function. If this is the case, we say that our probabilistic theory 
converges to the simpler representation (i.e. it requires only a special case of our full probabilistic logic.). 
In the Maximum Entropy method of probabilistic reasoning. maximization of the entropy of P(W I W) is an augmenting 
assumption (i.e. part of D) in our probabilistic knowledge. It forces the convergence of the entailed CPI statements to single 
values. In effect, it is one big, global assumption which adapts flexibly to the other constraints. When examining the entailed 
CPI statements, however, it is not possible to tell whether a probability was "pinned down" (i.e. determined to have a unique 
value) by the CPI axioms in K, or instead left completely or partially underdetennined by them. Thus we lose "precision" and 
"justification" information about the probabilities. By comparinn lhe converged distribution with the P2(W 1 W) entailed in the 
absence of the maximum entropy assumption, we can make this distinction; we can tell what is the justification for our entailed 
probabilistic beliefs; and we can understand more clearly the effect, and the meaning in context, of the maximum entropy 
assumption. 
Dempster-Shaler theory has two essential aspects from the point of view of A-PL entailment. One is Dempster's Rule, which 
we discussed earlier. The other is the axiomatic structure underlying the mass function representation, and thus the 
equivalent belief function representation as well. While every belie! function is equivalent to an upper-lower distribution, the 
converse does not hold: not every upper-lower distribution is (representable as. i.e. equivalent to) a Dempster-Siwfer belief 
function. Indeed, it is quite easy to generate examples of theories in unaugmented probabilistic logic which are not expressible 
(fully equivalently) in the Dempster-Shaler formalism. One such K is 
11: 
0.3 < p(A V 13) 0.4 :::; p(A V C) 0.5 < p(ll V C) 
where A, B, and Care assumt..>d to form the set F (mutually exclu�;ive and exhaustive) of "primitive" propositions ("singletons" 
in Dempster-Shaler terminology). 
Thus the Dempster-Shaler belief function includes unique-valued probability as a proper special case, but is in turn included as 
a proper special case by interval-valued probability. It occupies nuseful middle position in the spectrun1 of representationnl 
richness and simplicity. This suggests exploiting the Dempster-Shaler representation possibly independently of 
employing Dempster's Rule. We might want to use some type of assumptions to ensure convergence of a P2 to a belief 
11 Example due 1o John Lowrance of Sn11n1erna1ional, privalo communlcntion, mid-1984. 
5 
function12• In a similar spirit, we may want to look for restrictions (and perhaps generalizations) of the Dempster-Shaler 
representation, along with associated convergence mechanisms. (7] is an interesting example of such an approach. 
Indeed, (pure) Dempster·Shafer theory is quite limited in its applicability to probabilistic reasoning in AI because it does not 
represent rules, i.e. arbitrary conditional probabilities. The only type of entailment in Dempster·Shafer is by use of Dempster's 
Rule, i.e. joint conditioning on the evidential sources of multiple belief functions. Once we understand Dempster·Shafer theory 
within the framework of A-PL, however, we can sec formally how to marry it to probabilistic rules, and to perform, for example, 
forward and backward chaining. 
Placing Dempster-Shaler theory in the framework of A·PL focuses the epistemological and decision-theoretic issues involved 
in applying it. The Dempster·Shafer notions of mass and belief are not (or at least, formally, need not be!) an issue beyond that 
of the use of probability bounds or intervals. The main semantic question is that of Dempster's Rule. So far as this author is 
aware, Dempster's Rule has resisted a clear intuitive analysis of its underlying assumptions. The correspondenee of 
Dempster's Rule in the special case of unique· valued probability to something akin to a conditional independence assumption 
(8] offers some hope that such an understanding will be forthcoming. 
Another, more limited example of a commonly-used assumption is the "fuzzy logic" rule of combination used to entail or infer 
the probability of a conjunction or a disjunction from the probabilities of the conjuncts or disjuncts. This was employed both in 
PROSPECTOR and in MYCIN. Formally, it says: 
p(A A B) min ( p(A) , p(B) p(A V B) max ( p (A) , p (B) ) 
for arbitrary propositions A and B (the conditional form is analogous). This assumption was apparently used because of the 
perceived need to maintain unique-valued probability. In fact, it corresponds to the assumption of maximal dependency 
between A and B, i.e. either that p(A!B) = 1 or that p(B!A) = 1. This is both strong and typically unjustified. as well as unsound 
in general as a rule of inference; its use in PROSPECTOR led to inconsistencies, and PROSPECTOR was accordingly forced to 
resort on occasion to renormalizing probabilities. If we allow ourselves to use a bounds representation, however, we can use 
the sound rule(s) of inference: 
p(A A B) < min ( p(A) , p(B) ) max ( p(A) , p(B) ) < p(A V B) 
Thus if we have p(A) = 0.3 and p(B) = 0.5 we can use: 
0 < p(A A B) < 0.3 ; and 0.5 < p(A V B) < 1 . 
Correlation sign information, employed for example in Greg Cooper's NESTOR [3], is also naturally represented as an 
inequality. Negative correlation is represented as an axiom of the form: 
p(A A B) < p(A) X p(B) ; 
positive correlation with the inequality in the other direction. This type of information is often available from qualitative causal 
knowledge. 
Analytic Application of the Paradigm: Inference 
Probabilistic inference is typically directed toward the entailed component P2(W I W) of T. It is a process of closure. We start 
with a data structure representing directly only the CPI axioms in K, i.e. let K = {Ki} where K1 is the axiom in the canonical 
form: 
In ihe beginning, all other bounds are at the trivial extremes of 0 and 1. By using D as well as the "tautologies" of 
unaugmented probabilistic logic proper, we proceed to narrow the bounds on probabilities p(W.I W.). I J 
Even if we want to converge ultimately to unique-valued probability, it is useful to think about the intermediate states of 
inference in terms of bounds. One view of probabilistic inference is as constraint propagation. We can generalize the concept 
12
John Lowrance of SRI International proposed using a maximum entropy principle to converge to a mass function, privata communication, mid·1984. 
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of a Local Event Group (LEG) [10] to that of a probabilistic sub -t heory in A-PL, with an associated propositional sub-space of 
W, as well as a group of axioms, both in CPI form and otherwise. 
Inference consists of applying constraints, but also, in our general scheme, of changing the conditionality on evidence 
sources. Usually we will not want to explore the whole space (WI W). 
Decisions based on probabilistic conclusions are often made by either ranking, i.e. which of several alternatives is more likely 
or has greatest probabilistically-weighted utility, or by thresholds, i.e. does some alternative have a sufficient probability or 
probabilistically-weighted utility. Thus bounds will ofte n suffice for dec i si on- m ak ing . This may obviate applying, for 
convergence's sake, strong assumptions which are not justified by our knowledge of the problem domain, and which may even 
be in conflict (i.e. inconsistent) with that knowledge. 
A-PL enables us to take a least-commitment or less-commitment approach to probabilistic reasoning, and allows us to clarify 
what probabilistic justif ication constitutes, both in general, and in particular (a problem raised in [6] for example). 
Given our newly-developed notions of entailment and inference for prob abilistic theories in augmented probabilistic logic, we 
can hope for fruitful insights into probabilistic reasoning schemes by addressing issues oft raditional concern for 
ordina r y non-probabilistic logics: foremost soundness and completeness. We defi ne a set of probabilistic inferences 
as sound iff for each sentence w, the inferred probability interval for w, is a superset of the entailed probability interval for Wr 
Intuitively, this corresponds to the inference being no "s tronger" than the entailment, where "stronger" means a tighter 
bound. We dHfine a set of probabilistic inferences as complete iff the inferred probability interval is a subset of the entailed 
probability interval. Thus sound and complete means the inferred distribution is identical to the entailed distribution. 
Conclusion 
We have presented a paradigm of probabilistic knowledge in terms of interval bounds, i.e. inequalities, augmented by 
additional assumptions (about which we have not said much in general), embodied primarily in the augmented logic of 
interval -va lueu conditional probability, A-PL. This is a formal, abstract representation, not a practical data structure for 
implementing probabilistic knowledge representation 13. 
The inequality paradigm lets us represent explicitly the incompleteness of our probabilistic knowledge both "logically", i.e. in 
terms of "enta1 lment" , and inferentially. It clarifies the effects of our assumptions, especially those we make to converge to a 
computationally simpler and more decision-theoretically useful theory. It provides a framework to analyze and combine the 
representations and assumptions used in different approaches to probabilistic reasoning. Finally, it enables us to integrate the 
advantages and capabilities of the different approaches, for example evidential reasoning and if-then chaining. 
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